An argument against Congressional term limits

I'm skeptical.  Very.

Yes, Missouri implemented eight-year term limits.  There's a middle ground between eight years and life.  Also, it's something that requires some length of time to settle into whatever it will ultimately be.  Give it time.  Adjust whatever problems arise.

In one recent survey, 75 percent of Americans said they supported term limits, including 65 percent of Democrats.

For that reason, it's worth spending a few minutes on this point, because it does get to a fundamental problem with how the public views Washington. There is a perennial myth that the problem with Washington is that the longer people spend there, the more corrupt they become. Therefore, the only way to ensure good judgment in politics is to constantly have a bunch of fresh-faced lawmakers who are total rookies and don't understand how anything in Washington works.

  Vox

That's a little extreme. Surely we could have people go to Congress from State legislatures after having proved some degree of competence there.

Since 15 states do have term limits, we actually can know something about their effects. And the political science literature here is pretty unequivocal. Term limits are the surest way to weaken the legislative branch and empower the executive branch. Term limits are also a great way to empower special interests and lobbyists. Basically, what term limits do is shift power toward those who are there for the long haul.

And how are executive branch politicians there for the long haul? They're subject to reelection, and in the case of the US president, limited to two terms (for now).

In one study, a post-term-limits respondent said that after term limits, "agencies [do] what they want to. [One bureaucrat told me] we were here when you got here, and we'll be here when you're gone." As the authors of this study note, "Legislative oversight is the venue of specialists. A term-limited legislature tends to be populated by generalists, who lack the accumulated knowledge to exercise oversight effectively, if they even recognize it as their responsibility."

Why is that? And, as I've said, maybe the term limits are too short.

In term-limited states, lawmakers and their staff have less time to build up expertise, since they are there for a limited time. But like the executive agencies of the state government, lobbyists and interest groups are also there year after year. They are the true repeat players building long-term relationships and the true keepers of the institutional knowledge. This gives them power.

Same argument. And why can't lobbying reforms be considered along with term limits? I'm sure we could think of something.

Also, as far as executive agencies go, often presidents hold over directors from the previous administration for continuity and institutional knowledge.  Those directors are still beholden to the policy desires of the president, who, and I repeat, is limited to two terms.

I've argued that the best way to reduce the influence of lobbyists in Washington is for Congress to invest in its long-term professional staffing capacity. The same logic applies if Congress wants to reassert its authority as the first branch.

Well, there you go. Career officials are the strength of our diplomatic corps. Perhaps professional career staffing in Congress could be investigated.  It may not be a good idea, but if that seems like a viable possibility, give it a shot.

[T]he reforms Democrats passed, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, actually did slow the revolving door. But as far anybody can tell, its minor tweaks to the revolving door did absolutely nothing to reduce the influence of lobbyists in Washington — again, because lobbyists' influence comes primarily from the fact that congressional staffers depend on lobbyists to make sense of policy.

That, again, is an argument against lobbyists, not against term limits. If staffers can't make sense of the policy without lobbyists explaining it to them, it's because the policy was written by lobbyists in the first place!

...but hey, do what you want...you will anyway.