Nuclear Accident Report

Under the Air Force’s own regulations, Accident Investigation Board reports are supposed to be made public.

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Errors by three airmen troubleshooting a nuclear missile in its launch silo in 2014 triggered a “mishap” that damaged the missile, prompting the Air Force to strip the airmen of their nuclear certification and quietly launch an accident investigation.

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The Air Force’s brief summary of the Juliet-07 mishap said the Minuteman 3 missile “became non-operational” during a diagnostic test on the evening of 16 May, 2014. The next morning a “mishap crew” chief, who was not identified, “did not correctly adhere to technical guidance” during troubleshooting efforts, “subsequently damaging the missile.” No further details about the damage or errors were revealed.

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The [...] mishap chief “lacked the necessary proficiency level” to anticipate the consequences of his actions during the troubleshooting.

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The damaged missile was removed from its underground silo, which is designated Juliet-07 and placed among wheat fields and wind turbines about nine miles west of Peetz, Colorado.

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In a statement, the Air Force declined to provide details of the incident or a copy of the report produced last November by the Accident Investigation Board, saying the information was classified and too sensitive to be made public.

  Guardian

Sensitive, doubtful.  Frightening. Embarrassing, perhaps.

Why did the mishap chief lack sufficient proficiency for his job?

In seeming contradiction of that [...] point, the Air Force said in its separate statement to the AP that the mishap team chief was properly trained for the task he was performing. It said he and two other airmen on his team were immediately stripped of their certification to work with nuclear weapons. They remained decertified for “over a year,” until they were retrained and returned to nuclear duty.

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To prevent a recurrence of their mistake and the accident it caused, the Air Force said it has “strengthened” technical guidance, modified training curriculum and shared information about the conditions that led to the mishap with other units that operate Minuteman 3 missiles.

So, he wasn't up to snuff because his training was insufficient, but he still gets the blame?

The most recent previous Air Force investigation of an accident at an ICBM launch silo was in 2008. That investigation, which was publicly released, found that a fire in a launcher equipment room went undetected for five days. It uncovered the remarkable fact that the Air Force was using duct tape on cables linked to the missile.

Sigh.

Remember when nine nuclear missile base commanders were canned for cheating on their tests?

How about when guards failed to regain control over Minuteman missiles in a simulated enemy capture?

...but hey, do what you want...you will anyway.